Rights of the States in Their Natural Resources Particularly as Applied to Water by Woodbridge, Dudley Warner
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1952
Rights of the States in Their Natural Resources
Particularly as Applied to Water
Dudley Warner Woodbridge
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1952 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Woodbridge, Dudley Warner, "Rights of the States in Their Natural Resources Particularly as Applied to Water" (1952). Faculty
Publications. Paper 920.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/920
RIGHTS OF THE STATES IN THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES 
PARTICULARLY AS APPLIED TO WATER 
DuDL'EY WARRF.N WoooBRIDG~* 
SouRC'E oF R.IGH'l'S oli' S'l'A'l''Es 
The origin of the rights of the states to their natural resources is 
nowhere better stated than by Mr. Justice Stone in the case of Com-
11tat~wealth of Massachusetts v. State of New York: 1 
"The English possessions in America were claimed by right 
of discovery. The rights of property and dominion in the lands 
discovered by those acting under royal authority were held to 
vest in the crown, which under the principles of the British 
Constitution was deemed to hold them as a part of the public 
domain for the benefit of the nation .... As a. result of the Revo-
lution the people of each state became sovereign, and in that 
capacity acquired the rights of the crown in the public do-
main ... " 
The same principle was applied with respect to new states formed 
out of the territory of the original thirteen states.!~ However, title 
to lands ceded to or purchased by the United States is vested in the 
United States subject to treaty provisions and subsequent grants. 
The state is also the owner of all things ferae naturae. And in the 
well known case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.3 in which the 
State of Georgia sought to enjoin defendant Copper Companies from 
discharging noxious gases from their works in Tennessee over the 
lands in Georgia to the great injury thereof the Supreme Court of 
the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said: 
"This is a. suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity 
of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the 
earth and air within its domain." 
~(:b;;;ilor, Professor of Jurisprudence and Dean, Department of Jurisprudence, Col!ege 
of William and Mary. 
1. 271 u. s. 65, 79 (1925). 
2. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U. S. 1844). 
3. 206 u. s. 230, 237 (1906). 
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OwNERSHIP oF TmELA~'"DS 
In a series of cases culminating in U11ited States v. State of Louisi-
ana,4 the Supreme Court of the United States has held that no state 
has any title to the natural resources under tidal waters. (No, not 
even Texas.) 5 The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas 
stated: 
"The claim to our three mile belt was first asserted by the 
national government. Protection and control of the area are in-
deed functions of national external sovereignty. The marginal 
sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests, na-
tional responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The prob-
lems of commerce, national defense, relations with other powers, 
war and peace focus there. National rights must therefore be 
paramount in that area."6 
OwNERSHIP OF CLOl:JDS 
There has been much speculation as to who owns the clouds. Until 
recent years this speculation has been almost entirely academic, but 
since the advent of aviation and artificially induced rainfall the ques-
tion has already become of practical importance and will undoubtedly 
increase in importance as time moves on. The private owner of the 
surface has some rights, at least as far up as is needed by him for 
the quiet enjoyment of the surface and structures on the surface. 
In fact The Uniform Aeronautics Act even states :7 
"The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of 
this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the 
surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described in Sec-
tion 4." 
While this Act has been withdrawnS from the active list of recom-
mended uniform acts by the Commission on Uniform State Laws 
it has been adopted by some twenty-one states. 
As clouds are ferae 11aturae, fugitive in nature, and e..xist over 
sovereign states, it is arguable that the states have a qualified owner-
ship. 
Since other states of the Union are affected by another's use of 
the douds and since our national defense and our interstate com-
4. 339 u. s. 699 (1950). 
5. United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950). 
6. 339 u. s. 699, 704 (1950). 
7. UNIFORM AttoNAUTics Acr, § 3, 11 U. L. A. 160 (1938). 
8. 11 U. L. A. (1949 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 11). 
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merce and our navigable streams are vitally connected with the 
atmosphere it is arguable that the United States also has rights. Mr. 
Gus 0. Hatfield in discussing legal problems raised by artificial rain-
making concludes a note in the Vanderbilt Law Review as follows :9 
"On the other hand, property interests and individual rights 
must be protected against unwarranted invasions by the negli.,. 
gent or capricious rain-maker. The only feasible solution ap-
pears to be some form of governmental regulation. It is doubtful 
that completely successful controls could be imposed at the state 
level, since interstate problems are certain to arise whenever 
weather control is attempted on any substantial scale. All of 
the problems which exist, especially the property aspect will be 
duplicated at both interstate and international levels. The effects 
of an artificially induced rainstorm cannot be confined to political 
boundaries. It therefore appears likely that in the near future 
it will be necessary to regulate rainmaking, not only by rules of 
nation-wide application, but also by international treaty." 
STATE OWNERSHIP OF wATERS: INTRODUCTION 
There are various classifications of waters resulting from precipi-
tation, but for the purposes of this paper I will use the following: 
(1) 'Vaters flowing either on the surface or under the surface in a 
·reasonably ascertainable well defined channel; (2) Surface waters 
not flowing in a reasonably well defined channel and not collected 
in natural ponds and lakes; (3) Underground waters not flowing 
in a well defined channel commonly called percolating waters and ar-
tesian waters. 
Waters flowing on the surface in a. reasonably well defined channel 
are either navigable or non-navigable though some writers have still 
a third kind, namely floatable but not navigable. 
What are the rights of the states in each of these? 
RIGHTS oF STATES IN SuRFACE WATERS FLowiNG IN \VELL 
DEFINED CHANNELS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The waters of navigable streams and the beds of such streams are 
the property of the states subject however to certain rights of the 
federal government and of riparian owners. The prevailing test of 
navigability in the United States is one of fact. A stream is navi-
gable when it is used, or is susceptible of being used, in its ordinary 
9. 4 VANDERBIL'l' LAw REV. 332, 337; See also BALL, SHAPING THE LAW oF 
\VA'l'ER CoNTROL, 58 YALE L. J. 
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condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel 
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel 
on water.10 
It is equally well settled that the states do not own the waters or 
beds of non-navigable streams. Thus in a Virginia case, Garden 
Club of Virginia v. Virginia Public Service Con~pany,ll it was held 
that a statute giving certain jurisdiction of the «waters of fhe state" 
to the State Corporation Commission had no application to the waters 
of a non-navigable stream, and hence in that case permission of the 
State Corporation Commission was not a prerequisite for the con-
struction of a dam sixty-three feet high and four hundred fifty feet 
long near Goshen Pass in that State. 
SAME: RIGHTS oF THE: UNITtn STATts- GtNtRAI, 
The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission 
lists seven major limitations of the states on their powers of control 
of and use of their waters.12 It is certain that some of these will be 
hotly denied by many, but at least they are worthy of our considera-
tion. 
SAME:: CoMMtRCE PowER 
The most important of these limitations is that of the commerce 
power. Where a river is used for the transportation of goods in 
interstate commerce even though the river is an intrastate one (such 
as the James River) it is a public highway. Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall as early as 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden ,IS said: 
"The power of Congress . . . comprehends navigation with-
in the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that naviga-
tion may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with for-
eign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian 
tribes'." 
And in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 14 the Supreme Court said: 
"Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate com-
merce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the 
extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States 
which are accessible from a State other than those in which 
10. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1 (1935). 
11. 153 Va. 659, 151 S. E. 161 (1930). 
12. Vol. 3, WATER REsouRCEs LAw, pp. 5 to 72. 
13. 9 WHEAT. 1, 197 (U. S. 1824). 
14. 3 WA!.L. 713, 724 (U. S. 1865). 
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they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the 
nation, and subject to all requisite legislation by Congress." 
But generally, except for tidal waters there would be no navigable 
streams but for the convergence of innumerable non-navigable ones. 
As control of the non-navigable streams that affect the navigability 
o£ navigable streams is or may be necessary for the control of the 
latter Congress has jurisdiction over the former to the extent needed 
for the protection of the latter.l5 
Ramifications of this right of the United States over the navigable 
waters of the country include flood control projects and the develop-
ment and disposition of electric power for the exercise of the com-
merce authority by Congress is not invalidated because it elects to 
serve purposes in addition to navigation, even if such other purposes 
would not alone justify an exercise of Congressional power.l6 
Moreover the Federal Power Act17 provides for the issuance of 
licenses to nonfederal agencies for the development of water power 
on streams under its jurisdiction. Any private company operating 
'a power development prior to the passage of that Act took subject to 
the powers of Congress and may be lawfully required under that 
Act to accept a license with all its obligations and conditions.lB 
SAMr:: Fr:nr:RAI. PROPRIJ;;'l'ARY Powr:R 
Another possible limitation on the rights of the state is the pro-
prietary power of the federal government. This power exists in a 
number of phases. Article IV, Section 3, Clause II of the United 
States Constitution which deals with the admission of new states 
reads in part : 
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States ... " 
And in United States v. San Francisco,19 the United States Su-
preme Court stated : 
"The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress 
is without limitations. " 
15. See United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899) 
and Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U. S. 508 (1941). 
16. See Arizona v. California, 283, U. S. 423, 456 (1931). 
17. 41 STAT. 1063, 49 STAT. 838, as amended, 16 U. S. C. 791a-825r. 
18. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F. 
2d 155 (C. A. D. C. 1941), cert. denied 315 U. S. 806 (1942). 
19. 310 u. s. 16, 29 (1939). 
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In Light v. United States,20 the same court said: 
"And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be 
administered. That is for Congress to determine. " 
And in Canfield 'l!. United States,21 the Supreme Court states: 
"While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the 
unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, 
which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the 
admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of 
legislating for the protection of the public lands though it may 
thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the 
police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its 
own protection. A different rule would place the public domain 
of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." 
The United States has acquired in one way or another vast tracts 
of lands. In the ownership of these lands it is not an ordinary owner, 
or even an ordinary riparian owner, for a state may not by legisla-
tion without the consent of Congress "destroy the right of the United 
States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued 
flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the bene-
ficial uses of the government property".22 
When the United States acquires land from a state by purchase 
with consent of the state the latter can with the consent of the United 
States reserve certain specified rights of sovereignty,23 but when the 
land is acquired without or despite the consent of the state the United 
States is not subject to any jurisdictional control by the state which 
would impair or destroy the effective use for the purpose for which 
the land was acquired.24 
SAME: WAR PowER 
Under the war power25 and the 1916 National Defense Act,26 
Congress authorized the President to cause an investigation to be 
made to determine the best means for the production of nitrates and 
other products for munitions of war. Out of this legislation there 
20. 220 u. s. 523, 537 (1911). 
21. 167 u. s. 518, 525 (1897). 
22. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). 
23. See Collins v. Yosemite Part & Curry Co., (taxing jurisdiction) 304 
u. s. 518, 530 (1938). 
24. Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 539 (1885). 
25. U. S. CoNS'l'. Art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 11; Art. I, § 9, d. 7. 
26. 39 STAT. 166, 50 U. S. C. A. 79. 
136 SouTH CAROLINA LAw QuAR'l'tRLY 
eventually came the Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee 
River and finally the whole Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 
But this is fast becoming the atomic age, and Congress knows 
that fact. By statutes passed August 1, 194627 there are: (1) A 
declaration of policy to the effect that there be established "a pro-
gram for Government control of the production, ownership, and use 
of fissionable material to assure the common defense and security 
and to insure the broadest possible exploitation of the field ;"28 (2) 
With two unimportant exceptions the Atomic Energy Commission, 
as agent of the United States, shall be the exclusive owner of all 
facilities for the production of fissionable material;29 (3) "All right, 
title, and interest within or under the jurisdiction of the United 
States, in or to any fissionable material, now or hereafter produced, 
shall be the property of the Commission ;"30 and, "no person shall 
have any title in or to any fissionable material ;"31 ( 4) "As used in 
this chapter the term 'source material' means uranium, thorium or 
any other material which is determined by the Commission with the 
approval of the President, to be peculiarly essential to the produc-
tion of fissionable materials ;"32 ( 5) "The Commission is authorized 
and directed to purchase, take, requisition, condemn, or otherwise 
acquire, supplies of source materials or any interest in real property 
containing deposits of source materials to the extent it deems neces-
sary to effectuate the provisions of this chapter."33 
I might put in parenthetically that it would not be too surprising 
if within the foreseeable future atomic power will be available for 
the large scale purification of ocean water and for the pumping of 
it and other waters wherever we desire for all our manifold uses. 
But be that as it may, I believe that it is safe to predict that the 
states as such will have little or no control over atomic energy and 
the natural resources required for its utilization. 
SAME: GENERAL WtLFARE CLAUSE 
Further Congress is expressly empowered to levy taxes for the 
general welfare : 
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes . 
27. 60 STAT. 755, 42 U. S. C. A. 1801 et seq. 
28. !d. § 1801 (4). 
29. ld. § 1804 (c) (1). 
30. Id. § 1805 (a) (2). 
31. Ibid. 
32. Id. § 1805 (b) (1). 
33. Id. § 1805 (b) (5). 
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and provide for the common defense and general welfare of 
the United States."34 
While the proper construction of this clause is controversial to 
say the least the Supreme Court of the United States has gone so far 
as to assert :35 
"Thus the power of Congress to promote the general welfare 
through large scale projects for reclamation, irrigation and other 
internal improvements, is now as clear and ample as its power 
to accomplish the same results indirectly through resort to 
strained interpretation of the power of navigation." 
The only certain limitation appears to be that such power should 
be exercised for the common benefit as distinguished from some 
mere local purpose.36 Query: ·what is a mere local purpose? We 
have grown to be so interdependent that what is done in one locality 
frequently affects in one way or another what is done in many other 
places. 
SAME: DoCTRINE ol" EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT 
The rights of the states over their water courses may be further 
limited in some cases by the doctrine of equitable apportionment. 
This doctrine has been chiefly applied in the western States to inter-
state streams to insure to the inhabitants of each state involved a 
fair share of the benefits from the use of such waters. This result 
should be attained in so far as possible without quibbling over formu-
las.37 
SAME: INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
Congress in 1911 authorized in advance the entering into by the 
states of interstate compacts "for the purpose of conserving the 
forests and the water supply of the States."38 To date these com-
pacts have been used chiefly to apportion the waters of interstate 
streams, and to control pollution and floods. The action taken there-
under is binding upon the citizens of each state and all water claim-
ants, even where the State had granted the water rights before it 
had entered into the compact.39 
34. U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
35. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 738 (1950). 
36. Ibid. 
37. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). 
38. 36 STAT. 961, 16 U. S. C. 552. 
39. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106 (1938). 
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SAME: RrGH'rS oF RIPARIAN OwNERS 
The right of the state to its navigable waters is also subject to cer-
tain rights of riparian owners which the state can take away by emi-
nent domain proceedings unless, of course, the United States is the 
riparian owner. Each such owner has a right of access to the chan-
nel, and the right to make a reasonable use of the water as it flows 
by and in connection with riparian land so long as he does not un-
reasonably pollute or divert it. The sommon law maxim is "Waters 
should flow as they have been accustomed to flow". When there is 
a great surplus of water for everyone no harm is done by such a rule, 
but when there is an acute shortage of water what rule could be more 
ridiculous? In effect such a rule would mean, "Since there is not 
enough water for all no one can use in substantial quantities what 
there is -and cursed be the non-riparian owners !" 
SAME: SuMMARY 
Thus while the states own their navigable waters this ownership 
is subject to the commerce power, the war power, the proprietary 
property rights, the treaty making power, the general welfare power 
of the federal government, the doctrine of equitable apportionment 
where the stream is an interstate one, to any interstate compacts that 
have been made as well as the rights of riparian owners. 
THE Jus PuBLICUM AND THE Jus PRIVA'rt::i:II 
It is also said that the ownership of the states' navigable waters 
has a double aspect- the jus publicum or public right and the jus 
privatum or private right. To the extent that a state owns its navi-
gable waters and the beds of streams in its private right it may alien 
the same as any owner, as for example a lease of a part of the bed of 
a drowned river bottom for the propagation of oysters. But to the 
extent that a state owns in its public right it owns in trust for all its 
citizens and can grant no monopoly. These principles were brought 
out strongly in the case of Commonwealth v. Newport News,40 in 
which it was held that the legislature of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia had the power to authorize the City of Newport News to dis-
charge its untreated sewage into the waters of Hampton Roads as 
long as no public nuisance resulted and navigation was not inter-
fered with despite the fact that such pollution might contaminate 
nearby oyster beds and interfere with established recreational uses 
40. 158 Va. 521, 164 S. E. 689 (1932). 
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of the tidal waters. The Commonwealth as owner in its private 
right could decide what use of that right best served the public in-
terest, and any lessee of river bottoms for oyster culture took subject 
to such possibilities. 
PERcoLATING vVATERs: RIGHTs oF THE STATEs 
The State is vitally interested in the maintenance of the water 
table, for on it depends the capacity of wells and springs and to a 
great extent the production of all agricultural products. The water 
table in turn for the most part is dependent on percolating waters 
for its maintenance, i. e. that portion of the total rainfall that sinks 
into the ground rather than runs off or evaporates. These waters 
are in the very nature of things well nigh impossible of ownership 
until actually reduced to possession so that while they are in one 
sense the property of the state in much the same way as are wild 
animals this ownership (if it may be called such) is quite restricted. 
But it is sufficient to permit regulation as to such matters as waste, 
interference for spite only, and pollution. 
Another type of percolating water is known as artesian water. 
It has its origin for the most part in the mountains where as a re-
sult of tilted strata the waters get under bed rock and gradually 
work their way to the seas or other outlets. These waters are fre-
quently under pressure and in such a situation when the lower strata 
are tapped these waters flow naturally to the surface. The principal 
problem here is to prevent waste for experience has shown that an 
uncapped flowing well in one locality may affect the supply of quite 
distant localities. 
OwNERSHIP oF BEDS oF STREAMS 
In the case of non-navigable waters the ownership of the beds of 
the streams is in the adjoining landowners and not in the state. But 
in the case of navigable streams the ownership of the beds is in the 
state. \iVhether this state ownership e..'Ctends to the ordinary low 
water mark or to ordinary high water mark is a question in much 
dispute. It has been held in Florida41 and in South Carolina42 that 
the State owns to the high water mark. But according to some writ-
ers43 the better view, albeit a minority one, is that public ownership 
extends only to low water mark, and such is the law by statute in 
Virginia.44 
41. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. R Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917). 
42. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. SO ( 1884). 
43. See MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.) pp. 85-86 (1928). 
44. VA. ConE ANN. § 62-2 (1950). 
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OwNERSHIP oF SuRFACE \VATERS 
Waters gathered together on the surface of the land and not run-
ning in any well defined channel and not a part of a natural lake or 
pond are commonly called surface waters. Generally everyone dis-
claims ownership of them. According to one theory (mistakenly called 
the common law theory) 45 they are a common enemy from which 
let him save himself who can, subject of <:ourse to the general rule 
that in saving oneself one should do no more damage than necessary 
to others. According to another theory known as the civil law rule 
lower land is by nature servient to higher land in the matter of drain-
age. The role of the State in the case of surface water is primarily 
that of arbiter. Nevertheless there is at least in some localities a 
strong public policy in favor of control and conservation of tempo-
rarily excessive surface water in ponds, cisterns, and reservoirs. 
STATE oR FEDERAI. CoNTRor. AND DEVEI.OPMENT? 
In the development, use, and conservation of these natural re-
sources owned by the states the question is bound to arise, and has 
arisen over and over, as to whether cities, counties, states, or the 
federal government should play the dominant part. It is easy to say 
that local matters should be handled by the local governments, and 
general matters should be handled by the state or federal government 
either directly or through private enterprise. But this problem has 
too many ramifications for a paper of this sort. It is obviously in the 
interests of the nation as well as the states that we all use our water 
resources to their fullest potentialities. The main thing is that this 
be done wisely, efficiently and honestly. By whom it is to be done 
is, after all, of secondary importance.46 
45. See John B. Rood, Surface Waters in Cities, 6 MICH. L. Rmr. 449, 452. 
46. For bibliographies on this subject prepared with special reference to the 
Central Valley of California but equally applicable to other projects see 38 
CAI.IF. L. Rltv. pp. 761-781. 
